Abstract. We present a general framework for constructing two-message oblivious transfer protocols using a modification of Cramer and Shoup's notion of smooth projective hashing (Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'02, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2332, pp. 45-64, Springer, Berlin, 2002 Science, vol. 2045, pp. 119-135, Springer, Berlin, 2001), whose security is based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption. In particular, we give two new oblivious transfer protocols. The security of one is based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, and the security of the other is based on the N th Residuosity Assumption. Compared to other applications of smooth projective hashing, in our context we must deal also with maliciously chosen parameters, which raises new technical difficulties.
Introduction
In [5] , Cramer and Shoup introduced the first practical encryption scheme that was proved CCA secure in the standard model, with security based on the Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) Assumption. They later presented an abstraction of this scheme based on a notion that they called "smooth projective hashing" [6] . This abstraction yielded two new CCA secure encryption schemes; the security of one is based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption [11] and the security of the other is based on the N th Residuosity Assumption [19] . 1 The notion of smooth projective hashing was later used by Gennaro and Lindell [10] in the context of key generation from humanly memorizable passwords. That work abstracts and generalizes an earlier protocol for this problem due to Katz et al. [14] , whose security is based on the DDH Assumption.
In this work we use smooth projective hashing to construct efficient two-message oblivious transfer protocols. Our work follows the same pattern, in that it abstracts and generalizes earlier protocols for this problem [1, 17] whose security is based on the DDH Assumption. Using smooth projective hashing in this context raises a new issue. Specifically, we must deal with the case that the hash family itself is chosen maliciously by the adversary. To this end, we add an extra requirement to the definition of smooth projective hashing. This issue did not arise in the previous two applications because these were either in the public key model or in the common reference string model, and in these models the parameters can be assumed to be generated honestly.
We show that even with this additional requirement, we can still construct smooth projective hashing from any of the following assumptions: the DDH Assumption, the N th Residuosity Assumption, and the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption. Moreover, for the last two constructions we can prove security even when the underlying RSA modulus is not a product of safe primes. We note that all previous factoring-based constructions of smooth projective hashing did rely on the assumption that the underlying RSA modulus is a product of safe primes.
Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer, first introduced by Rabin [20] , is a central primitive in modern cryptography. It is a protocol between a sender, holding two strings γ 0 and γ 1 , and a receiver holding a choice bit b. At the end of the protocol the receiver should learn the string of his choice (i.e., γ b ) but learn nothing about the other string. The sender, on the other hand, should learn nothing about the receiver's choice b. Oblivious transfer serves as the basis of a wide range of cryptographic tasks. Most notably, any secure multi-party computation can be based on a secure oblivious transfer protocol [12, 15, 21] . Oblivious transfer has been studied in several variants, all of which have been shown to be equivalent. The variant considered in this paper is the one by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [9] (a.k.a. 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer), shown to be equivalent to Rabin's original definition by Crépeau [7] .
Much work has been devoted to improving the efficiency of oblivious-transfer protocols, motivated by the fact that oblivious transfer is many times the main efficiency bottleneck with in protocols for secure multi-party computation. In particular, constructing round-efficient oblivious transfer protocols is an important task. Indeed, Naor and Pinkas [17, Protocol 4 .1] and Aiello et al. [1] independently constructed a two-message (1-round) oblivious transfer protocol based on the DDH Assumption. Their work was the starting point of our work.
Smooth Projective Hashing
Smooth projective hashing was introduced by Cramer and Shoup [6] . Informally, a projective hash family is a family of keyed hash functions with two types of keys: the primary hashing key that can be used to compute the hash function on every point in its domain, and a projective key that can only be used to compute the hash function on a "special subset" of its domain. Moreover, to efficiently compute the hash value using the projective key one also needs a "witness" for membership in the special subset. (The domain is typically denoted by X and the special subset is typically denoted by L.) A projective hash family is smooth if the projective key gives (almost) no information about the value of the hash function on points outside the special subset. An important property that is used in all the applications of such families is that it is hard to distinguish members of the special subset from non-members. This is called the hard subset membership property.
Oblivious Transfer from Smooth Projective Hashing
We present a methodology for constructing a two-message oblivious transfer protocol from any (variant of a) smooth projective hash family. In particular, the protocols in [1, 17] can be viewed as a special case of this methodology. Moreover, we show that this methodology gives rise to two new oblivious transfer protocols; one based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, and the other based on the N th Residuosity Assumption. Similarly to the protocols from [1, 17] , our protocols achieve a indistinguishability-based security notion, not a simulation-based notion, see Sect. 3 for further discussion of this point.
The Basic Idea Given a smooth projective hash family with the hard subset membership property, consider the following two-message oblivious transfer protocol. Recall that the sender S takes as input a pair of strings γ 0 , γ 1 The functionality of the protocol is implied by the projection property. The security of the receiver is implied by the hardness of the subset membership problem on X, since guessing the value of b implies distinguishing between a random member and a random non-member. The security of the sender (against an honest-but-curious receiver) is implied by the smoothness property of the hash family. Specifically, given a random projective key pk and any element in x ∈ X \ L, the value H k (x) is statistically indistinguishable from random. Thus, the message y 1−b gives no information about γ 1−b (since
Malicious Receivers The above protocol works for an honest-but-curious receiver, but the security of the sender is no longer guaranteed when considering malicious receivers. For example, a malicious receiver might choose x 0 , x 1 ∈ L and learn both γ 0 and γ 1 .
To overcome this problem, we extend the notion of smoothness so that it is possible to verify that the function is smooth on at least one of x 0 , x 1 . Note that this must hold even if the hashing parameters Λ are maliciously chosen by the receiver.
Implementing this extended notion in the context of the DDH assumption is straightforward [1, 17] . Loosely speaking, in this case the hashing parameters consist of a prime p and two elements g 0 , g 1 ∈ Z * p of prime order q|(p − 1). The hashing domain is X
: r ∈ Z q }, and the witness is the exponent r. To enable the sender to verify that two elements x 0 , x 1 are not both in L, we instruct the receiver to generate x 0 , x 1 by choosing at random two distinct elements r 0 , r 1 ∈ Z q , setting Notice that x b is uniformly distributed in L, x 1−b is uniformly distributed in X \ L, and the sender can easily verify that at least one of x 0 , x 1 is not in L by merely checking that they agree on their first coordinate and differ on their second coordinate.
Factoring-Based Smooth Projective Hashing
Implementing smooth projective hashing with the extra verifiability property in the context of the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption and the N th Residuosity Assumption is not as easy. This part contains the bulk of technical difficulties of this work.
On top of providing the additional verifiability property, we were also able to somewhat relax the underlying assumptions that were used in prior work. The factoringbased constructions of smooth projective hashing, in the work of Cramer and Shoup (as well as all subsequent works), were only proved secure for the special case where the RSA modulus in use is a product of safe primes. Namely, they used N ← pq where p, q are distinct odd primes such that p = (p − 1)/2 and q = (q − 1)/2 are also odd primes. 2 This restriction was explained by "technical reasons," but we observe that it is not needed: in fact our factoring-based constructions can be proved secure also for "generic" RSA moduli (i.e., for any N ← pq where p, q are two odd primes of the same size).
Moreover, using the same tools we can eliminate the need for safe primes in the CCA encryption schemes that are based on smooth projective hashing (i.e., they too can be implemented without safe primes). Indeed, we observe that encryption schemes in the literature that are based on the N th Residuosity or Quadratic Residuosity Assumptions (cf. [3, 6, 10] ) remain secure even when the underlying RSA modulus is not chosen as a product of safe primes. In the Appendix A we explain how the proofs for the existing schemes can be modified to prove this stronger result, and exemplify it in detail for the proof of Camenisch and Shoup from [3] .
Eliminating the Safe Primes
We describe the idea that allows us to eliminate the need for safe primes in the construction of smooth projective hashing based on the N th Residuosity Assumption. (For the construction based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, the idea is similar but even simpler.)
The only place where prior work really used the safe-prime condition is in proving the hard subset membership property. Namely, one needs to prove that it is hard to distinguish the special subset of the hashing scheme from the entire domain.
In the construction based on the N th Residuosity Assumption, the hashing parameters are the RSA modulus N and a random N th residue g modulo N 2 , such that g is a quadratic non residue with Jacobi symbol +1. The hashing domain is all the elements in Z * N 2 with Jacobi symbol +1, denoted by J N 2 , and the special subset is the subgroup g that is generated by g. The safe-prime condition is used to argue that, with high probability, g generates the subgroup of all the N th residues with Jacobi symbol +1. This is the case since the size of J N 2 is ϕ(
q . Thus, with high probability, a random quadratic non residue in the group J N 2 generates the entire group J N 2 , which implies that, with high probability, g generates the subgroup of all the N th residues with Jacobi symbol +1. Thus, the N th Residuosity Assumption (for elements with Jacobi symbol +1) immediately implies that it is hard to distinguish the special subset from the entire domain.
When N is just a plain old RSA modulus, we lose the property that with high probability g generates the subgroup of all the N th residues with Jacobi symbol +1 (this subgroup is typically not cyclic). We thus need a slightly more involved reduction to prove the hard subset membership property. In Lemma 5 we show that the N th Residuosity Assumption implies that it is hard to distinguish the subgroup L def = g from the subgroup X def = g · 1 + N of all the elements that can be generated as x ← g r (1 + N) s mod N 2 . We therefore get a smooth projective hashing scheme with domain X and special subset L, and we have the hard subset membership property.
One can see, however, that this construction is still missing one aspect that was present in prior notions. Namely, there could be elements of Z * N 2 that are not in the hashing domain X. Moreover, given the parameters N, g and an element x ∈ Z * N 2 , there does not seem to be an easy way of deciding whether or not x ∈ X. This does not pose any problem for the application to oblivious transfer, but it potentially poses some problems in the case of chosen-ciphertext-secure encryption. Luckily, we show in the appendix that the proof of CCA security can be carried through even with this aspect missing.
Notations
For any positive integer X we denote the set {0, 1, . . . , X − 1} by either [X] or Z X . We always denote the security parameter by n. A function ν : N → [0, 1] is said to be negligible if for every polynomial p(·) and for every large enough n, ν(n) < 1/p(n).
For an algorithm A, y ← A(x) denotes running A on input x and assigning the result to y. If A is randomized then we denote y $ ← A(x) and y is a random variable. We also denote by x $ ← S the action of uniformly choosing an element from the set S. For any two random variables X, Y , let Dist(X, Y ) denotes the statistical difference between X and Y , namely Dist(X, Y )
where S contains the support of both X and Y . We say that X and Y are -close, denoted X ≈ Y , if Dist(X, Y ) ≤ . We say that the ensembles X = {X n } n∈N and Y = {Y n } n∈N are statistically indistinguishable, denoted X s ≡ Y , if there exists a negligible function (·) such that for every n ∈ N, the random variables X n and Y n are (n)-close.
We say that the ensembles X = {X n } n∈N and Y = {Y n } n∈N are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X c ≡ Y , if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) distinguisher D there exists a negligible function (·) such that for every n ∈ N,
For simplicity, throughout this paper we say that two random variables X n and Y n are computationally (or statistically) indistinguishable, meaning that the corresponding distribution ensembles {X n } n∈N and {Y n } n∈N are computationally (or statistically) indistinguishable.
Security of Oblivious Transfer
Our definition of oblivious transfer is similar to the ones considered in previous works on oblivious transfer in the Bounded Storage Model [2, 8] , and similar to the definition considered in [17] in the context of their DDH-based two-message oblivious transfer protocol. We remark that the definition below is specific for two-message protocols, as we only deal with such protocols in this work. In these protocols, the receiver R sends the first message, and the sender S sends the second message.
Definition 1 (Secure Implementation of Oblivious Transfer). A two-message, twoparty protocol (S, R) is said to securely implement oblivious transfer for -bit strings (where : N → N) if it is a protocol in which both the sender and the receiver are probabilistic polynomial-time machines that get as input a security parameter n in unary representation. Moreover, the sender gets as input two strings γ 0 , γ 1 ∈ {0, 1} (n) , the receiver gets as input a choice bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and the following conditions are satisfied:
• Functionality: If the sender and the receiver follow the protocol then for any security parameter n, any two input strings γ 0 , γ 1 ∈ {0, 1} (n) , and any bit b, the receiver outputs γ b whereas the sender outputs nothing. • Sender's security: Denote by S(1 n , γ 0 , γ 1 , q) the response of the honest sender with input (1 n , γ 0 , γ 1 ) when the receiver's first message is q. Then there is a negligible function ν such that for any n > 0, any three messages γ 0 , γ 1 , γ ∈ {0, 1} (n) , and any message q ∈ {0, 1} * (from a possibly cheating, not necessarily polynomialtime receiver), it holds that
Note that similarly to the definitions in [2, 8, 17] , Definition 1 is not a simulationbased definition but rather an indistinguishability-based one. Although it is a meaningful notion and is sufficient for some application, it is still weaker than the simulation-based notion: In particular it is cannot offer the same composability properties, and hence it is harder to use it as a building block in secure multi-party computation protocols.
The simulation-based definition compares the "real world," where the parties execute the protocol, to an "ideal world," where no message is exchanged between the two parties; rather, there is a trusted party that takes an input from both parties, computes the output of the Oblivious Transfer functionality on these inputs, and sends the corresponding output to each party. Loosely speaking, the simulation-based definition asserts that for every efficient adversary A (controlling either the sender or the receiver) in the "real world" there exists an efficient simulator S, controlling the same party in the "ideal world," so that the outputs of the parties in the ideal world are computationally indistinguishable from their outputs in the real world. In particular, the simulator S needs to simulate the view of the adversary A in a computationally indistinguishable manner.
We note that Definition 1 does give a simulation-based guarantee in the case that the sender is corrupted (if you allow a resetting simulator). In this case, the simulator (who does not know the choice bit of the actual receiver) simulates the (honest) receiver first with choice bit b = 0, and then it resets the sender and simulates the honest receiver with choice bit b = 1. This way the simulator extracts both messages γ 0 and γ 1 from the corrupted sender A. It then gives (γ 0 , γ 1 ) to the trusted party. Then the simulator uses the view of the cheating sender A in the first execution (with the choice-bit b = 0). The fact that this view is indistinguishable from the "real world" view follows from the receiver's security which asserts that {R(1 n , 0)} n∈N c ≡ {R(1 n , 1)} n∈N , and from the fact that sender does not receive any output from the trusted party.
On the other hand, Definition 1 does not give a simulation-based guarantee in the case that the receiver is corrupted. The reason is that a malicious receiver is not guaranteed to "know its own choice bit b", and therefore the simulator does not know which input bit to send to the trusted party in order to obtain the desired output γ b . However, Definition 1 does guarantee an exponential time simulation of the receiver's view of the interaction (similarly to the definition from [17] ). Loosely speaking, the simulator can extract in exponential time a choice-bit b that is consistent with the receiver's first message q. Then the simulator gives this bit b to the trusted party, receives an output γ , and simulates the sender's message in the protocol by setting it to be S(γ, 0 (n) , q) if b = 0 and S(0 (n) , γ, q) if b = 1. This implies that the interaction gives no more information than what an unbounded receiver can derive from just the value of γ b . (We note that if the receiver is "honest but curious" then the same simulation strategy can be implemented in polynomial time, and thus Definition 1 does guarantee simulation-based security for honest-but-curious adversaries.)
Smooth Projective Hash Functions
Our definition of smooth projective hashing differs in some ways from prior definitions [6, 10] , mainly in that we add the requirement that it is possible to verify that at least one of two given elements is a non-member. We also depart from the presentation in previous work and define the notion of smooth projective hashing in terms of the procedures that are used to implement it rather than in terms of languages and sets. (This is merely a presentation issue, we believe that it makes the presentation clearer.) At the end of this section we briefly discuss the mapping between our presentation and the one used in previous work.
Syntax A hash family H is defined by means of the following six polynomial-time algorithms, H = (PG, IS, IT, HG, Hash, pHash):
• The parameter-generator PG is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the security parameter and outputs some parameters, Λ $ ← PG(1 n ). We assume that the security parameter can be inferred from Λ, and denote the security parameter corresponding to Λ by n(Λ).
• The instance-sampler IS is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the parameters Λ and outputs a triple, (w, x, x ) $ ← IS(Λ). The intent is that x is a member of the special subset, x is a non-member, and w is a witness for the membership of x in the special subset.
• The instance-testing algorithm IT tests the parameters Λ and two strings x 0 , x 1 , namely IT(Λ, x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ {0, 1}. The intent is to test that at least one of x 0 , x 1 is not a member in the special subset.
• The hash-key generator HG is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the parameters Λ and outputs two keys (i.e., a primary hashing key and a projective key),
• The primary hash algorithm Hash takes the parameters Λ, a hash key k, and an element x, and outputs a string y ← Hash(Λ, k, x).
• The secondary (projection) hash algorithm pHash takes the parameters Λ, a projective key pk, and a pair (w, x), and outputs a string y ← pHash(Λ, pk, w, x).
For every string Λ, consider using Λ as the hashing parameters and let G Λ denote the set of possible hash values with these parameters, namely
It helps to think of G Λ as a group where we can efficiently compute the group operation and its inverse. In most of this paper, the group G Λ will be the set of -bit strings (with the xor operation) where = (n(Λ)) for some polynomially-bound function (·). Definition 2. Let H = (PG, IS, IT, HG, Hash, pHash) and let Λ and x be two strings.
Smoothness Let ≥ 0. We say that H is -smooth on (Λ, x) if the following two distributions are -close:
and (pk, y)
The first distribution is induced by choosing (k, pk) $ ← HG(Λ) and outputting (pk, Hash(Λ, k, x)), and the second is induced by choosing independently y
and outputting (pk, y). Projection We say that H is projective on (Λ, x) if for every pair of primary hashing keys k, k for which there exist a projective key pk such that both (k, pk) and (k , pk) are in the support of HG(Λ), it holds that
It is easy to verify that -smoothness on (Λ, x) and projection on (Λ, x) are contradictory requirements (assuming that
Definition 3 (Smooth Projective Hashing).
A family H = (PG, IS, IT, HG, Hash, pHash) is a smooth projective hash family if there exists a negligible function :
(Clearly condition (a) above implies in particular that H is projective on (Λ, x), since the left-hand-side is independent of k except via the corresponding pk.) 
Definition 4 (Verifiable Smoothness
)(w, x, x ) ∈ support(IS(Λ)), it holds that IT(Λ, x, x ) = IT(Λ, x , x) = 1. (d) For every Λ, x 0 , x 1 such that IT(Λ, x 0 , x 1 ) = 1, it holds that either H is (n(Λ))- smooth on (Λ, x 0 ) or it is (n(Λ))-smooth on (Λ, x 1 ) (or both).
Definition 5 (Hard Subset Membership
Note that the difference between A n and B n is just in the order of x and x . Note also that this condition is stronger than just requiring indistinguishability between members and non-members in the special subset (since x and x may be chosen in a dependent manner). This stronger requirement is needed for the Oblivious Transfer application.
Comments
The definitions above are formulated in a way that is convenient for use in our application of Oblivious Transfer, but may make it harder to see the correspondence to the notions that were defined in previous work [6, 10] . We now briefly discuss this correspondence and provide some other clarifications.
Dealing with "Bad Inputs" We stress from the outset that many of the notations and definitions above do not depend on the inputs to the various algorithms being chosen "the right way." For example, the set G Λ is well defined even when Λ is not in the support of the parameter-generation algorithm, and similarly the property of H being -smooth on (Λ, x) is well-defined for any two strings Λ and x.
In our application to Oblivious Transfer, we will use the hashing values only for instances that pass the instance-testing procedure, and will use that procedure to weed out nonsensical inputs. In particular, if we have some parameters Λ that are malformed (in a recognizable way) we can have the instance-testing always rejecting them, and then the verifiable-smoothness requirement will be vacuous for such parameters.
Hash Domain and the "Special Subset" Previous works presented the definitions in terms of some (parameter dependent) domain X Λ for the hash function, and a "special subset" of that domain, which is an NP language L Λ ⊂ X Λ . They also required that it be possible to sample both members of L Λ and non-members in X Λ \ L Λ . In our case, the special subset L Λ is the support of the second element in the output of the instance-sampler, and the non-members X Λ \ L Λ is the support of the third element, namely
Since we require that the hash family is projective on members of the special subset and smooth on non-members, it follows that these two sets are indeed disjoint (assuming that |G Λ | > 1).
The sampleable distributions on these sets are the ones induced by the instancesampler. We comment that for our application we need to choose these elements in a dependent manner, since we need to sample pairs (x, x ) that the instance-testing procedure accepts.
Projection and Smoothness
The projection definition that we use is the usual one: for x ∈ L Λ (i.e., x that was output as the second element in the output of IS(Λ)), the value of Hash(Λ, k, x) is determined by the corresponding projective key pk, and moreover it can be efficiently computed given a "witness" w using the algorithm pHash(Λ, pk, w, x). (This implies in particular that if there are a few "witnesses" for the same x, the value of pHash(Λ, pk, w, x) is the same for all of them.)
Our smoothness definition is the per-instance definition of Gennaro-Lindell rather than "random instance" definition of Cramer-Shoup. That is, we need H to be smooth for every non-member x rather than just for a random non-member.
Some Redundancies One can observe that the definitions above are somewhat redundant. For example, it is not hard to see that conditions (a), (c) and (d) of Definitions 3 and 4 together imply also condition (b) (assuming that |G Λ | > 1). Also if H has the hard subset membership property then requiring IT(Λ, x, x ) = 1 in condition (c) of Definition 4 implies that also IT(Λ, x , x) = 1 (except perhaps with a negligible probability).
Constructing 2-Message OT Protocols
We now show how to construct a two-message Oblivious Transfer protocol from smooth projective hash functions (defined in Sect. 4).
Let : N → N be a (polynomially-bounded, efficiently computable) function, let H = (PG, IS, IT, HG, Hash, pHash) be a verifiably-smooth projective hash family with the hard subset membership property (cf. Definitions 3-5), and assume for simplicity that for every setting of the parameters Λ ∈ {0, 1} * it holds that G Λ = {0, 1} (n(Λ)) . (At the end of this section we briefly discuss the (straightforward) modifications that are needed to deal with other domains.) 4 Let n be the security parameter. Let (γ 0 , γ 1 ) be the input of the sender, where γ 0 and γ 1 are (n)-bit strings, and let b ∈ {0, 1} be the input of the receiver. Otherwise the sender runs the hash-key generation algorithm twice independently to
, and sends (pk 0 , pk 1 , y 0 , y 1 ) to the receiver. R: The receiver retrieves γ b by computing
We next prove that the above protocol is secure according to Definition 1. The functionality follows from the fact that H is projective, which means that the value Hash(Λ, k, x b ) that the sender computes is equal to the value pHash(Λ, pk b , w, x) that the receiver computes. The receiver's security follows from the hard subset membership property, which means that it is hard to distinguish between the pairs (x, x ) and (x , x). The sender's security follows from verifiable smoothness, which means that for at least one of b ∈ {0, 1} the value of Hash(Λ, k b , x b ) is (almost) random in G Λ = {0, 1} , even given the projective key pk b .
Theorem 1. The above 2-message OT protocol is secure according to Definition 1, assuming that H is a verifiably-smooth projective hash family that has the hard subset membership property.
Proof. The functionality trivially follows from H being projective. Similarly, the receiver's security trivially follows from H having the hard subset membership property, since {R(1 n , 0)} n∈N = {A n } n∈N and {R(1 n , 1)} n∈N = {B n } n∈N , where {A n } n∈N and {B n } n∈N are from Definition 5. Hence a probabilistic polynomial-time senderŜ that can predict with non-negligible advantage the choice bit b when interacting with R(1 n , b) (on infinitely many auxiliary inputs {z n } n∈N with |z n | ≤ poly(n)) is by definition a distinguisher between {A n } n∈N and {B n } n∈N .
It is left to prove the sender's security. Fix n ∈ N and γ 0 , γ 1 , γ ∈ {0, 1} (n) . Let X = (Λ, x 0 , x 1 ) be the first message sent by the receiver. If X is rejected by the testing algorithm, i.e. IT(Λ, x 0 , x 1 ) = 0, then the sender aborts regardless of its input (so the three random variables S(1 n , γ 0 , γ 1 , X), S(1 n , γ 0 , γ , X), and S(1 n , γ , γ 1 , X) are identical). If IT(Λ, x 0 , x 1 ) = 1 then by verifiable smoothness we know that either H is -smooth on (Λ, x 0 ) or it is -smooth on (Λ, x 1 ), for some negligible . In the latter case we have
and in the former case we similarly get
Why Two Hashing Keys? We note that in the protocol above the sender chooses two independent hashing key pairs (k 0 , pk 0 ), (k 1 , pk 1 ). One may wonder whether the proof would go through if the sender used only one hashing key pair. We claim that the answer is no, and that choosing two independent hash-key pairs is essential, since otherwise the sender's security property of Definition 1 may be compromised. To see this, consider a modification where the sender uses only one key pair (k, pk), and consider a cheating receiver who sends a message X = (Λ, x 0 , x 1 ) where H is smooth on both (Λ, x 0 ) and (Λ, x 1 ). In this case, the definition of smooth projective hashing does not rule out the possibility that each of the values Hash(Λ, k, x 0 ), Hash(Λ, k, x 1 ) separately is enough to uniquely determines the hashing key k. In this case, the sender's message implies some relation between γ 0 and γ 1 , violating Definition 1.
Working with Different G Λ
In the protocol above we assumed that for all Λ the group G Λ is {0, 1} (n(Λ)) . Although it is always possible to use this setting (see discussion after Definition 6 in Sect. 6), one can sometimes gain efficiency by working with other groups. For example, for constructions based on DDH it is more natural to work with the underlying DDH group. The properties that we need from G Λ for our construction to work are the following:
• G Λ should be a quasi-group: Denoting the (quasi) group operation by '+', this means that for all a, b ∈ G Λ there exist unique x, y ∈ G Λ such that a + x = y + a = b.
• The group operation '+' and its inverse '−' can be computed efficiently. Namely, there should be a polynomial-time algorithm that on inputs Λ and a, b ∈ G Λ computes c = a + b ∈ G Λ , and another one that on inputs Λ and b, c ∈ G Λ computes a = c − b (i.e., an element a ∈ G Λ such that a + b = c).
• It should be possible to encode and decode the sender's inputs as elements in G Λ .
If the sender's inputs are -bit strings, there should be polynomial-time algorithms Encode, Decode so that for all s ∈ {0, 1} it holds that Encode(Λ, s) ∈ G Λ and Decode(Λ, Encode(Λ, s)) = s.
To work with such a (quasi) group, we modify the protocol so that instead of just computing The security of this protocol is proved similarly to Theorem 1. The arguments for functionality and receiver security are exactly as before. As for the sender security, we
Since G Λ is a quasi-group, this last distribution is the uniform distribution over G Λ , regardless of what Γ is, and the proof follows.
Constructing Smooth Projective Hash Families
We next present two constructions of verifiably-smooth projective hash families with the hard subset membership property. In one construction the hard subset membership property is based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, and in the other the hard subset membership property is based on the N th Residuosity Assumption. A key vehicle in both constructions is the notion of a verifiably--universal projective hash family.
Definition 6 (Universal Hashing). Let H = (PG, IS, IT, HG, Hash, pHash), let Λ and x be two strings, and let > 0. We say that H is -universal on (Λ, x) if for all y 0 ∈ G Λ and all pk 0 ∈ {0, 1} * it holds that
where the probability is taken over a random choice (k, pk)
The definition of Verifiably--universal Projective Hashing is similar to Definitions 3 and 4 of Verifiably--smooth Projective Hashing. Specifically, conditions (a) and (c) below are identical to the ones in Definitions 3 and 4, and conditions (b ) and (d ) only differ in that we replaced -smooth by -universal (and need not be negligible).
Definition 7 (Verifiably--universal Projective Hashing). Let (·) be a function.
A family H = (PG, IS, IT, HG, Hash, pHash) is an -universal projective hash family if for every Λ in the support of PG, every (w, x, x ) in the support of IS(Λ), and every (k, pk) in the support of HG(Λ), it holds that
We say that H is verifiably--universal projective hash family if in addition:
(c) For every Λ in the support of PG and every (w, x, x ) in the support of IS(Λ), it holds that
Cramer and Shoup have shown in [6] how to transform an -universal projective hash family into a smooth projective hash family (for any < 1), and the same transformation also works for transforming verifiably--universal projective families into verifiably-smooth projective families. In a nutshell, one first reduces to t by choosing t independent hashing key-pairs and hashing t times the same element. One then uses a "strong randomness extractor" [18] to extract a nearly uniform bit string from the t hash values. The new hash algorithms thus use t keys of the original algorithms and also the seed s for the extractor, setting k 1 , x) 1 , w, x) , . . . , pHash(Λ, pk t , w, x) .
To extract bits, it is sufficient to choose t so that t · log(1/ ) ≥ + ω(log(n(Λ))) (see, e.g., Lemma 4 in the long version of [6] ). 5 We comment that the resulting construction always has G Λ = {0, 1} , regardless of the group G Λ of the original construction. In the remainder of this paper we present two such constructions, one based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption and the other based on the N th Residuosity Assumption. Both schemes are obtained by modifying the universal projective schemes of Cramer and Shoup to add the verifiable-universality property (and also to improve some parameters).
Some Algebraic Facts
We begin by recalling some algebraic facts that are used throughout the two constructions. For a finite algebraic group G (written multiplicatively), the order of G is the number of elements in it. The order of an element x ∈ G, denoted ord(x), is the smallest positive integer e such that x e = 1, and it always divides the order of the group. Some other useful facts about the order of groups and elements are stated below. , namely β | ρ · ord(y). But since β and ρ are co-prime, β must divide ord(y). 
For any
x ∈ G, ord(1/x) = ord(x). Also for any x, y ∈ G, ord(xy) divides ord(x) · ord(
A Construction Based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption
where Primes(n) denotes the set of prime numbers between 2 n and 2 n+1 and J N is the subgroup of Z * N of elements with Jacobi symbol +1.
Blum Integers A Blum integer is a product of two primes, both of which are congruent to 3 modulo 4. It is not hard to see that if the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption holds, it must also hold when the moduli are chosen as Blum integers. This follows since (a) Blum integers are "dense" (i.e., when choosing p, q $ ← Primes(n), there is a nonnegligible probability to get p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4)), and (b) Given a reliable oracle for Quadratic Residuosity, it is easy to check if a modulus N = pq is a Blum integer (by checking that N ≡ 1 (mod 4) and that N − 1 is not a quadratic residue modulo N ) . Below we will assume that determining quadratic residuosity is hard modulo Blum integers.
The Cramer-Shoup Scheme Cramer and Shoup constructed in [6] an -universal projective hash family from the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption (in the special case where N is a product of two safe primes). Omitting some details, the hash parameters are the modulus N ← pq and a quadratic residue g $ ← QR N , the hashing key is a random integer k $ ← {1, 2, . . . , N/2}, the projective key is pk ← g 2k mod N , the "special subset" is L N,g = {g 2w : w < N/2}, the exponent w is a "witness" for x ∈ L N,g , and the "non-members" are those elements x ∈ J N \ QR N (i.e., the elements of even order). Given the witness w for the element x and the projective key pk, one can compute the hash value as
Cramer and Shoup proved that when N is a product of two safe primes, this scheme is a (1/2)-universal projective family. Moreover, they also proved that when N is a product of two safe primes, distinguishing members from non-members can be reduced to the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption. These proofs make strong use of the fact that when N is a product of two safe primes, the subgroup of quadratic residues is cyclic and consists of exactly those elements in Z * N whose order is odd.
Our Modifications In our case we must also consider a maliciously chosen modulus N that is not necessarily a product of two primes. To get verifiable smoothness (or verifiable universality) we need a way of checking that (a) the order of the element g is odd, and (b) the order of at least one of the two given elements x 0 , x 1 is even. The latter test can be done by checking that x 0 = N − x 1 (which implies that ord(x 1 /x 0 ) = 2, and hence x 0 , x 1 cannot both have odd order). For the former test, since we do not know how to test that g has odd order, we instead force it into the subgroup of odd-order elements by raising it to the power of 2 log N . Namely, instead of using the element g itself we use the element g 2 log N . (We note that the trick of forcing g into the odd-order subgroup was used also in [13] , as a way of eliminating the need for moduli of a special form.)
Detailed Construction
Using our notations from Sect. 4, we now describe the six algorithms that define the hash family H QR = (PG, IS, IT, HG, Hash, pHash).
Parameter-generator PG(1 n ) Choose at random two n-bit prime numbers p, q, with p < q < 2p − 1 and p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4). Set N ← pq, choose at random an element
and output Λ ← (N, g).
Instance-sampler IS(N, g) Choose at random w IT(N, g, x, x ) Check that N > 2 2n , g, x ∈ Z * N , and x = N − x. Output '1' if all the tests pass and '0' otherwise. Hash(N, g, k, x ) Output x k mod N .
Instance-testing algorithm

Hash-key generator
HG(N, g) Choose k $ ← Z N , set T ← 2 log N and pk ← (g T ) k mod N . Output (k, pk).
Primary hashing algorithm
Projective hash algorithm pHash (N, g, pk, w, x) Output pk w mod N .
Remark. Since we only use the value g T for hashing (never g itself), one may be tempted to drop the squaring in the Parameter-generator and simply choose at ran-
We note, however, that our proof of the hard subset membership property (Lemma 3) relies on this extra squaring operation.
Proof of Security
We now show that the construction above has a hard subset membership domain under the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, and that it is a verifiable--universal projective hash family with ≈ 
Lemma 3. Under the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, the construction of H from Sect. 6.2.1 has the hard subset membership property.
Proof. We need to prove indistinguishability between the ensembles
A n = N, g, x, x n and B n = N, g, x , x where arithmetic is modulo N , and both ensembles are taken over choosing
Recall that when N is a Blum integer, then the quadratic residues modulo N are exactly these elements that have odd order in Z * N (since the order of QR N is ϕ(N)/4, which is odd). Moreover, every quadratic residue has exactly four square roots modulo N . If (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 ) are the four square roots of some x ∈ QR N then exactly one of them is itself a quadratic residue modulo N (call it r 1 ), and exactly two have Jacobi symbol +1 modulo N , namely r 1 and N − r 1 .
Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a PPT algorithm A that distinguishes between the ensembles A n and B n with non-negligible probability. Let
We describe a PPT distinguisher D for Quadratic Residuosity modulo Blum integers with advantage (close to) (n). Since the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption implies in particular that it is hard to decide quadratic residuosity modulo Blum integers, D violates the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption. The distinguisher D(N, z) in our reduction works as follows: (N, g, x 0 , x 1 ), and output b. Below we analyze the reduction under the simplifying assumption that the exponent w is chosen uniformly in Z ϕ(N) rather than in Z N , both in the scheme and in the reduction. It is well known that this modification changes the various distributions by only O(2 −n ) (where n is the bit-length of p, q).
Under this assumption, we show that when z is a quadratic residue the input to A is distributed according to A n , and when z is a quadratic non-residue the input to A is distributed according to B n . It thus follows that when z is a random element in QR N then D outputs 1 with probability p 1 (n) and when z is a random element in J N then D outputs 1 with probability p 2 (n), so the advantage of D is p 1 (n) − p 2 (n) = (n) (minus the negligible deviation caused by our simplifying assumption).
In both cases, the modulus N is chosen just like in the scheme H QR and the element g is a random quadratic residue modulo N . It is left to show that (x 0 , x 1 ) in the reduction are distributed like (x, x ) in the scheme when z is a quadratic residue, and like (x , x) in the scheme when z is a quadratic non-residue.
Case 1: z ∈ QR N . In this case we know that β def = ord(z) is an odd integer, which implies that the order of g = z 2 mod N is the same as the order of z, namely ord(g) = ord(z) = β. Also, since β is odd, μ def = 2 −1 mod β and τ def = T −1 mod β exist, and we have z = g μ (mod N). Hence in this case we can write
(τμ+w) (mod N).
Now notice that since w is random in Z ϕ(N) and β divides ϕ(N), the random variables τ μ + w mod β and w mod β are identically distributed, so x 0 ← g T (w+μτ ) mod N in the reduction is distributed identically to x ← (g T ) w mod N in the protocol. 
and by the same arguments as above we see that x 1 ← g T (w+μτ ) mod N in the reduction is distributed identically to x ← (g T ) w mod N in the protocol.
Lemma 4. The construction of H QR from Sect. 6.2.1 is a verifiable--universal projective hash family, where
Proof. The projectiveness and the completeness of the instance-testing (conditions (a) and (c) in Definition 7) are easy to check: For any RSA modulus N and any g ∈ QR N , w ∈ Z N , and k ∈ Z N , setting x ← (g T ) w mod N and pk ← (g T ) k mod N (where T = 2 log N ) we get for Condition (a):
Also condition (c) holds trivially. The more interesting property is the verifiable--universality (property (d )), which we prove next. (Note that properties (a), (c), and (d ) together imply also property (b ).) Let (N, g, x, x ) be any four elements such that IT (N, g, x, x ) = 1. Namely, N > 2 2n , g, x ∈ Z * N , and x = N − x. Note that since x/x = −1 (mod N) and ord(−1) = 2, at least one of x, x has an even order modulo N . We next show that for any element z of even order, H QR is -universal on (N, g, z) , which implies that it must be -universal on at least one of x, x .
Fix an odd modulus N > 2 and some g, z ∈ Z * N such that e def = ord(z) is even. Also denote τ def = ord(g T ) (where T = 2 log N ) and observe that τ must be odd and must divide ϕ(N). We again make the simplifying assumption that the hashing key k is chosen from Z ϕ(N) instead of from Z N , thus introducing an error of O(1/ √ N) = O(2 −n ) into the analysis. Under this assumption we show that for any pk and any y, it holds that
We consider the following procedure for choosing k
, and then set k ← k 0 + τ · k 1 . Note that pk = (g T ) k depends only on the choice of k 0 . It is therefore sufficient to show that for any k 0 (that determines pk) and any y, it holds that Pr k 1 [z k 0 +τ ·k 1 = y] ≤ 1 2 . In other words, let K y be the set of all values that yield y,
and we need to show that K y contains no more than
2τ values. We observe that e (the order of z) does not divide τ (the order of g T ) since e is even and τ is odd. Therefore z τ = 1 (mod N), which means that for any value of k 1 , z k 0 +τ ·k 1 = z k 0 +τ ·(k 1 +1) (mod N). Hence the set K y cannot contain two consecutive integers, and since 
A Construction Based on the N th Residuosity Assumption
Let N be an odd positive integer and consider the multiplicative group Z * N 2 and the two subsets
R N is the set of N th residues, which is a subgroup of Z * N 2 of order ϕ(N). G N is also a subgroup of Z * N 2 , which is homomorphic to the additive group Z N (and thus has order N ). Moreover, the order of an element (1 + vN) in Z * N 2 equals the order of v in the additive group Z N . The group Z * N 2 is homomorphic to the direct product of G N and
The N th Residuosity Assumption, originally introduced by Paillier [19] , asserts (informally) that for an RSA modulus N , it is hard to distinguish random elements of Z * N 2 from random elements of R N .
Assumption 9 (N th Residuosity [19]). The following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable
where Primes(n) denotes the set of prime numbers between 2 n and 2 n+1 .
The Cramer-Shoup Scheme Cramer and Shoup constructed in [6] an -universal projective hash family from the N th Residuosity Assumption (in the special case where N is a product of two safe primes). This construction is very similar to the quadratic Residuosity construction, with the group of quadratic residues modulo N replaced with the group of N th residues modulo N 2 . Omitting some details again, the hash parameters Λ are the modulus N ← pq and an N th residue g ∈ R N (with Jacobi symbol +1), the hashing key is a random integer k $ ← {1, 2, . . . , N 2 /2 }, the projective key is pk ← g k mod N 2 , and the hash is computed as Hash(N, g, k, x) = x k mod N 2 . The "special subset" is L N,g = {g w : w < N/2}, the exponent w is a "witness" for x ∈ L N,g , and the "non-members" are those elements x ∈ Z * N 2 (with Jacobi symbol +1) whose order is divisible by p or q. Given the witness w for the element x and the projective key pk, one can compute the hash value as
Cramer and Shoup proved that when N is a product of two safe primes, this scheme is an -universal projective family with ≈ max{1/p, 1/q}. Moreover, for that case they reduced distinguishing members from non-members to the N th Residuosity Assumption. Similarly to the Quadratic Residuosity construction, here too the proofs make strong use of the fact that when N is a product of two safe primes, the N th residues are exactly those elements of Z * N 2 whose order is co-prime to N , and moreover the subgroup of N th residues with Jacobi symbol +1 is cyclic.
Our Modifications In our case we must also consider a maliciously chosen modulus N that is not necessarily a product of two primes. To get verifiable smoothness (or verifiable universality) we need a way of checking that (a) the order of the element g is co-prime with N , and (b) the order of at least one of the two given elements x 0 , x 1 is not co-prime with N . For the former, since we do not know how to test that g belongs to the subgroup of elements whose order is co-prime with N , we instead force it into that subgroup by raising it to the power of N 2 log N . Namely, instead of using the element g itself we use the element g N 2 log N mod N 2 . (Again, the use of this trick is similar to [13] .)
The latter verification can in principle be done by checking that x 1 = x 0 and that mod N 2 ) . This implies that the order of x 1 /x 0 in Z * N 2 divides N and is greater than one, and as ord(x 1 /x 0 ) divides ord(x 1 ) · ord(1/x 0 ) = ord(x 1 ) · ord(x 0 ), it means that ord(x 1 ) and ord(x 0 ) cannot both be co-prime with N . In our scheme, however, we use a slightly more elaborate test that yields better universality bound . Specifically, we test that x 1 /x 0 is of the form (1 + vN) where v and N are co-prime. With these modifications (which are introduced to get verifiability), we also observe that we no longer need the RSA modulus to be a product of safe primes, and also we do not restrict our attention to elements with Jacobi symbol +1.
Detailed Construction
Using our notations from Sect. 4, we now describe the six algorithms that define the hash family H NR = (PG, IS, IT, HG, Hash, pHash).
Parameter-generator PG(1 n ) Choose two random n-bit prime numbers p, q (with Projective hash algorithm pHash(N, g, pk, w, x) Output pk w mod N 2 .
Instance-testing algorithm
Remark. Since we only use the value g T for hashing (never g itself), one may be tempted to drop the exponentiation in the Parameter-generator and simply choose at
We note, however, that our proof of the hard subset membership property (Lemma 5) relies on this extra exponentiation. 
Proof. We need to prove indistinguishability between the ensembles
A n = N, g, x, x n and B n = N, g, x , x where the arithmetic is modulo N 2 , and both ensembles are taken over choosing
Assume without loss of generality that there is an infinite set S ⊆ N such that for every n ∈ S it holds that p 1 (n) ≥ p 2 (n), and moreover
. We now describe a PPT distinguisher D for the N th Residuosity Assumption with advantage (close to) (n)/2 for every n ∈ S, using A as a subroutine. D(N, z) works as follows: We first claim that when the input z is chosen as a random N th residue modulo N 2 then the distribution on (N, g, x, x ) is nearly identical to the distribution in the actual scheme. To see this, first note that since N was chosen as N ← pq where p, q are primes and p < q < 2p − 1, N and ϕ(N) are co-prime. Next, we make the simplifying assumption that the exponent w is chosen at random in Z ϕ(N) instead of from Z * N (in both the reduction and the instant-sampling algorithm of the scheme itself). It is well known that this modification changes the various distributions by only O(2 −n ) (where n is the bit-length of p, q).
Since R N has order ϕ(N), which is co-prime with N , it follows that the maps x → is done in exactly the same way in the scheme and in the reduction. We thus get that for every n ∈ S,
We next show that when z is a random element in Z * N 2 then the input to A is independent of the bit b. We first observe that for any fixed x ∈ Z * N 2 and w ∈ Z * N , choosing at random v $ ← Z * N and setting x ← x(1 + vN) induces the same distribution as setting x ← x(1 + vwN) (since both v and vw are uniform in Z * N ). In the rest of the analysis, we therefore consider this alternate setting of x in Step 2 of the reduction. Namely, we consider the modified reduction where Step 2 is replaced by
Note that with this alternate step, we have
Next notice that for any fixed v ∈ Z * N and a randomly chosen z $ ← Z * N 2 , the two distributions (z, z(1 + vN) ) and (z (1 + vN) , z) are identical. This implies that also the two distributions (z w , (z (1 + vN) ) w ) and ((z(1 + vN) ) w , z w ) are identical, for every fixed v, w ∈ Z * N . Finally, since for all z, v is holds that z N = (z (1 + vN)) N (mod N 2 ) , the distribution of the random variable (N, z N , z w , (z(1 + vN) ) w ) = (N, g, x, x ) is identical to the distribution of the random variable (N, z N , (z(1 + vN) ) w , z w ) = (N, g, x , x) . Hence the input of A (and therefore also its output) is independent of the bit b that D chooses in Step 1, and thus Pr[D(N, z)
Combining the analysis for the two cases, we get that for every n ∈ S,
Lemma 6. The construction of H NR from Sect. 6.3.1 is a verifiable--universal projective hash family where (n) ≤ 2 −n + 2 −2n .
Proof. The projection and the completeness of the scheme (conditions (a) and (c) in Definition 7) are easy to check: For any RSA modulus N and any g ∈ R N , w ∈ Z * N , and
we get for condition (a):
As for condition (c), the instance-sampler sets x ← x(1 + vN) mod N 2 for some v ∈ Z * N . Condition (c) follows from the fact that N, g, x, x ) such that IT(N, g, x, x ) = 1. Namely, N > 2 2n , g, x ∈ Z * N 2 , and
N (which means that also x ∈ Z * N 2 ). We show that either H NR is -universal on (N, g, x) or it is -universal on (N, g, x ) .
, and recall that the order of d in Z * N 2 is the same as the order of v in the additive group Z N , which is exactly N (since v is co-prime with N ). By Lemma 2, there exist two integers α, β such that αβ = N , α divides ord(x) and β divides ord(x ). We now show that H is ( (N, g, x ) , and a similar argument shows that it is also ( (N, g, x) . Observing that N > 2 2n and thus either α or β must be larger than 2 n completes the proof.
Recall that the hashing key is chosen as k $ ← Z N 2 , the projective key is then computed as pk ← g T k mod N 2 where T = N 2 log N , and the hash function is computed as Hash(N, g, k, x) = x k mod N 2 . We make the simplifying assumption that the hashing key k is chosen from Z ϕ(N 2 ) instead of from Z N 2 , thus introducing an error of
into the analysis. For the rest of the proof denote τ def = ord(g T ) and observe that τ is co-prime with N and must divide ϕ(N). Consider now the following procedure for choosing the hashing key k, which implies the same distribution as choosing k
− 1}, and then set k ← k 0 + τ k 1 . Observe that the projective key pk depends only on the choice of k 0 , since g T (k 0 +τ ·k 1 ) = g T k 0 (mod N 2 ). Below we prove, however, that the hash value on at least one of x, x must depend also on the choice of k 1 . Since k is chosen as k = k 0 + τ k 1 , we have
Also, since τ is co-prime with N , it is also co-prime with β (as β divides N ). Hence for two different values k 1 = k 1 (mod β) we also have τ k 1 = τ k 1 (mod β). As β also divides ord(x ), this means that also τ k 1 = τ k 1 (mod ord(x )), and therefore (x ) τ k 1 = (x ) τ k 1 .
Next notice that τ |ϕ(N) implies τ ≤ ϕ(N) and so − 1 ≥ N − 1 it means that no value has probability of more than (N, g, x ) . A symmetric argument shows that H is ( (N, g, x) . Since αβ = N > 2 2n , at least one of α, β must be larger than 2 n , hence H is (2 −n + 2 −2n )-universal on at least one of (N, g, x) or (N, g, x ) .
Performance
We analyze the performance of our two oblivious transfer schemes: the one based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption from Sect. 6.2 (cf. Fig. 1) , and the one based on the N th Residuosity Assumption from Sect. 6.3.
The QR-Based Scheme
We start with the performance of the sender, whose input consists of two -bit input strings γ 0 , γ 1 (and also the security parameter n). The sender gets (N, g, x 0 ) from the receiver and it first verifies that 2 2n+2 > N > 2 2n and that g, x 0 are co-prime with N , and computes x 1 ← N − x 0 and h ← g 2 2n mod N . Denoting λ = + ω(n), the sender then chooses 2λ random elements k The modular exponentiations can be sped up using multi-exponentiation techniques (see [16] for a survey). 6 For example, to compute the pk (i) b 's, we can first compute all the powers h 1 , h 2 , h 4 , . . . , h 2 2n+1 , and then each pk (i) b can be obtained as a subset product of these 2n + 2 elements (with the subset-size being roughly n on the average). Pre-computing more powers of h can be used to speed-up the computation further: For a "window-size" parameter w, one can pre-compute ≈ 2 w · 2n/w powers, and then each pk (1) σ , . . . , y (λ) σ ) ⊕ Y σ . The total work is therefore one key generation, + ω(log n) modular exponentiations, and a few other faster operations (including one extraction operation). We cannot use multi-exponentiation techniques for the receiver, since these exponentiations all have different bases. However, since the receiver knows the factorization of N, it can use Chinese-remaindering to speed up the exponentiation by a constant factor.
. . , λ}), and computes
pk (i) b ← h k (i) b mod N and y (i) b ← (x b ) k (i) b mod N .
The NR-Based Scheme
Below we denote λ def = +ω(log n) n . Since the constructions from Sect. 6.3 is 2 −nuniversal, we need to repeat it λ times to get smoothness with output length of bits. We begin again with the sender. On input γ 0 , γ 1 (and n), the sender gets from the receiver (N, g, x multi-exponentiation. (On the other hand, the computation of h is independent of the inputs σ, γ 0 , γ 1 , so in some applications it can perhaps be done off line.) For long input strings, > n 2 , the computation of the pk (i) b 's and y (i) b 's may also become significant (4λ full exponentiations), and this can be sped-up with multi-exponentiation techniques.
Considering the receiver, on input σ (and n), it generates a 2n-bit RSA modulus N , A Small Optimization We observe that we can slightly improve the sender's complexity by having the sender check that N is not divisible by any number smaller than n. Then both the sender and the receiver can use h ← g T for T = N 4n/ log n (instead of T = N 4n as above), which would reduce the complexity of the sender roughly by a log n factor. The reason that this works is that we use the exponentiation to T only to ensure that the order of g T is co-prime with N . If N does not have divisors smaller than n, then for every x whose order is not co-prime with N we have ord(x N ) ≤ ord(x)/n, and therefore, taking T = N log n N 2 , x T must have order co-prime with N .
Conclusions
We presented in this work a general framework for constructing two-message oblivious transfer protocols using verifiable smooth projective function families. This is a modification of Cramer and Shoup's notion of smooth projective hashing: Compared to the original notion, we add the ability to generate pairs of inputs, so that one can verify that the function is not projective on both, without revealing which is projective and which is not. Using this framework, we gave two new oblivious transfer protocols; the security of one is based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption and the security of the other is based on the N th Residuosity Assumption.
In contrast to previous work on factoring-based smooth projective hashing, we were able to prove security of our schemes without requiring the RSA modulus to be a product of safe primes. Moreover, we observe that the safe-prime requirement is unnecessary for several previous works; in particular, for the CCA secure encryption schemes of Cramer-Shoup [6] and of Camenisch-Shoup/Gennaro-Lindell [3, 10] . One open problem that remains is to check if the safe-prime requirement can be eliminated from other factoring-based smooth projective hashing works. For example, the password authentication schemes of Gennaro-Lindell [10] and of Canetti et al. [4] . what is implied by the public key itself. (This is an information-theoretic argument that follows from the projectiveness of the hashing scheme.) 2. Decryption queries where x is not in the special subset L (i.e., where x ∈ X \ L), have incorrect tags w.h.p. (This is an information-theoretic argument that follows from the smoothness of the hashing scheme.) 3. The adversary cannot distinguish whether the x component of the challenge ciphertext is in the special subset L or is in X \ L (because of the hard subset membership property). 4. If the x component of the target ciphertext is in X \ L, then the target ciphertext contains no information about the plaintext, assuming no additional information about the primary hashing key k is given beyond its corresponding projective key pk. (This is again an information-theoretic argument, similar to the argument about the smoothness of the hashing scheme.)
Roughly speaking, the last two arguments imply that barring some additional information from the decryption queries, the target ciphertext cannot be distinguished from an entity that carries no information about the plaintext. The first two arguments, on the other hand, imply that the attacker cannot use the decryption queries to get any information beyond what is already implied by the public key. Combining these arguments, CCA security follows.
The Difficulty in Removing the "Safe Prime Requirement" Trying to use the constructions from Sect. 6 to get CCA security as above we run into some issues. Consider for example the construction of projective hashing based on the N th Residuosity Assumption. In this case, the parameters are Λ ← (N, g) where N is an RSA modulus and g is an N th residue modulo N 2 , the "special subset" is L = g , and the witness for membership in L is the exponent r such that g r = x mod N 2 . When N is not a product of safe primes, the set of N th residues in Z * N 2 is not a cyclic group (even when restricted to elements with Jacobi symbol +1), and in particular the "special subset" L = g does not contain all the N th residues in Z * N 2 . Since the hash function is only smooth on non-N th-residues, we can no longer claim that it is smooth on any x / ∈ L. In the Oblivious-Transfer application we "solved" this problem by defining X = g · 1 + N , which ensures that every element in X \ L is a non-N th-residue. However, in a CCA attack the attacker may choose to supply ciphertext elements that are not in this set X, and there does not seem to be an easy way of deciding whether or not x ∈ X. In essence, our problem is that we cannot rule out the possibility that the attacker may find ciphertext elements which are neither in the smooth domain nor in the projective domain.
Our Solution We overcome this problem by considering four sets rather than two: Namely, we have the "big domain" X = Z * N 2 , the "small domain" X * = g · 1 + N , the "projective subset" L = R N (of all the N th residues modulo N 2 ), and the "special subset" L * = g = X * ∩ L. The encryption scheme itself would produce only elements that belong to the "special subset" L * , but the attacker can submit decryption queries with arbitrary elements from the "big domain" X.
Then we use the facts that (a) the hashing scheme is projective on the "projective subset" L, 7 (b) the hashing scheme is smooth (or at least universal) on X \ L, and (c) the uniform distributions on L * and X * are indistinguishable (this is Lemma 7 below). The four arguments from above are refined as follows:
1 . The answers to decryption queries, where the x component belongs to the projective subset L, do not give any more information about the primary hashing key beyond what is implied by the public key itself. 7 (This is an information-theoretic argument that follows from the protectiveness of the hashing scheme.) 2 . Decryption queries where x is in X \ L have incorrect tags w.h.p. (This is an information-theoretic argument that follows from the smoothness of the hashing scheme.) 3 . The adversary cannot distinguish whether the x component of the challenge ciphertext is in the special subset L * or is in X * \ L * (because of the hard subset membership property). 4 . If the x component of the target ciphertext is in X * \ L * then the target ciphertext contains no information about the plaintext, assuming no additional information about the primary hashing key k is given beyond its corresponding projective key pk. (This is again an information-theoretic argument, similar to the argument about the smoothness of the hashing scheme.)
As before, arguments 3 and 4 imply that barring some additional information from the decryption queries, the target ciphertext cannot be distinguished from an entity that carries no information about the plaintext. Arguments 1 and 2 , on the other hand, imply that the attacker cannot use the decryption queries to get information that will help him distinguish the target ciphertext from an entity that carries no information about the plaintext.
Remark. Argument 1 from above is slightly incorrect, in that the hashing schemes from Sect. 6 may fail to be projective on the "projective subset" L. Specifically, if the order of the element g (which is a random N th residue) is not maximal (among the N th residues), then the projective key g k does not contain enough information on the hashing key k to fully determine the value of x k for every N th residue x. An easy solution here is to consider a mental experiment in which the hashing scheme is augmented by including a maximal-order N th residue h as a parameter and h k as part of the projective key (so both h, h k are included in the public key of the encryption scheme). These elements are never used by the encryption or decryption algorithms; their sole purpose is to leak to the adversary more information on the secret key, so as to make the Argument 1 from above correct. The arguments above are then applied to prove that this modified scheme is CCA secure, which implies that also the original scheme is CCA secure.
A.2. Reconstructing the Camenisch-Shoup Proof
We next reconstruct the proof from the long version of [3] , augmenting it to show that the N th-Residuosity-based encryption scheme of Gennaro-Lindell/Camenisch-Shoup [3, 10] is CCA secure even when the modulus is not a product of safe primes. 8 This modification is based on the same approach as in Sect. A.1, but is explained in greater detail. The encryption scheme consists of the following three algorithms. Remark. Some aspects of this construction are not really relevant for our discussion: These include the squaring of g during key-setup, the use of the "absolute values", the squaring of u and v and exponentiation to the N + 1 power during decryption, and also the inclusion of the attached labels. The reason that we keep these aspects here is because they are present in the scheme and proof from [3] , and we want to stress that we are proving the exact same scheme (using an almost identical proof), except that we omit the requirement of using safe primes. Clearly, the same proof as below can be applied also to the simplified scheme without these components.
Key Generation
A.2.1. Proof of Security
To prove security for moduli that are not product of safe primes, we use the following lemma. 8 We chose to reconstruct the proof from [3] since the presentation of that proof is more "from first principles" than that of the proof from [10] .
where the arithmetic is modulo N 2 and both ensembles are taken over choosing (N, z N , z t ) and outputs whatever A does.
Since N is co-prime with ϕ(N), it follows that if z is a random N th residue then so is z N , and moreover z = z N . Also, since (t mod ϕ(N)) is statistically close up to 2 −n to the uniform distribution over [ϕ(N)], z t is statistically close to the uniform distribution over z = z N .
We now show that for a random z Proof. The proof mimics closely the proof of Theorem 1 from the long version of [3] : We describe almost the exact same nine games that were considered in the proof of Theorem 1 there, in fact the only steps in which our proof differs from the one in [3] are Games 4-5 (see below). Game 0. This is the standard CCA-game. Namely, the key-generation algorithm is run on security parameter n, resulting in public key (s, N, g, y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) and secret key (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) as above. The attacker gets the public key as input, and it may issue decryption queries (e i , u i , v i , L i ), i = 1, 2, . . . . For each query, the attacker gets the result of running the decryption algorithm on these ciphertexts and labels. (This is called "Probing phase I" in [3] .) 1 + N . Hence the difference in success probability between Game 3 and Game 5 must be negligible. 9 Game 6. As done in the proof from [3] , we now choose u * not as a completely random element in g · 1 + N , but rather a random element in that group subject to the restriction that its order is divisible by N . Since a random element in that group satisfies this restriction with all but exponentially small probability, this has almost no effect on the success probability. , and we know that the order of u * is divisible by N (and u * is a square), which means that u * can be written as u * = w(1 + N) t with w a 2N th residue and t co-prime with N . Since the element e * is computed as
the distribution of e * is independent of m σ (and thus also of σ ). It follows that the view of the attacker is independent of σ , and therefore its success probability in this game is exactly 1/2. It remains to bound the difference between the success probability of the attacker in Games 7 and 8. Namely, we need to bound the probability that there exists some decryption query contradicting our working assumption that u i is not an N th residue modulo N 2 . Since N = pq with p, q primes, it follows that the order of u i is divisible by either p or q (or both). The rest of the argument follows the exact same line as in the proof of [3] (but our presentation is slightly different). We observe that the view of the attacker is completely determined by the following values: 9 The element g in Lemma 7 was chosen as a random N th residue, whereas here g is chosen as a random 2N th residue. However, it is clear that if μ N is indistinguishable from μ N · 1 + N then also μ 2N is indistinguishable from μ 2N · 1 + N .
• N, g and x i mod λ(N ) (which completely determine the answers of all the decryption queries).
• u * , σ and x 1 mod N (which together with the values above determine the value of the element e * of the target ciphertext).
• x 2 + α * x 3 mod N (which together with the values above determines the value of the element v * of the target ciphertext.
We therefore consider the alternative view of Game 8 where the values N, g, x i mod λ(N ), u * , σ , and x 1 mod N are chosen at the outset, and the values of x 2 , x 3 are chosen as follows:
• If the ith decryption query was made during "Probe phase I" then we choose x 2 , x 3 mod N after the attacker makes this query. Since both x 2 , x 3 are uniform in [N] and since u i , v i are fixed and the order of u i is divisible by p or q (and therefore so is the order of u 2 i ), then the probability of getting u 2(x 2 +α i x 3 ) i = v 2 i is at most 1/min(p, q).
• If the ith decryption query was made during "Probe phase II" then we choose the value of x 2 + α * x 3 mod N after the attacker determines the target messages m 0 , m 1 , and we choose x 2 + α i x 3 mod N after the attacker makes the ith decryption query. Since α i = α * (and they are both smaller than N ), the value of x 2 + α i x 3 mod N is still uniform in [N ] even after x 2 + α * x 3 mod N is fixed. Again, this implies that the probability of getting u 2(x 2 +α i x 3 ) i = v 2 i is at most 1/min(p, q).
We therefore determine that the probability that any decryption query i induces a difference between Game 7 and Game 8 is at most 1/min(p, q), and therefore the difference in the success probability between these two games is at most κ/min (p, q) where κ is the number of decryption queries. This completes the security proof.
